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BOOK REVIEWS
Candland, Douglas Keith, Feral Children and Clever Animals:
Reflections on Human Nature, xiii + 411pp. (Oxford University Press,
Oxford,1993).
Feral Children and Clever Animals purports to be about attempts by
humans to know about themselves by trying to understand the minds of
other beings: feral children and animals, and at least in the first half, it
fulfils this aim quite well. The discussion of the animal studies however
involves very little reflection on the investigators and is mainly confined
to a summary of the published results along with some questions about
what they might mean.
The 'feral children' who are the focus of the first half of the book are
Peter, Victor, Kaspar Hauser, Amala and Kamala. Candland looks at the
aims of the 18th and 19th century investigators of these children rather
than the specifics of the children's behaviour or abilities. It is the minds
of the investigators rather than the feral children that he sees of interest.
This is a novel slant on these stories and it allows Candland to present
his view of the history of psychology.
According to Candland, those who studied Peter discovered in the 18th
century, were primarily concerned with the question, 'what behaviour is
innate and what behaviour is learned?' and the social/political
ramifications of the answer. I wonder whether this description is
accurate given that the emphasis on behaviour seems to be a feature of a
much more recent psychology. It is clear however that the general
question about what in humans is innate and what is learned was an
important one at the time. Itard's study of Victor, Candland tells us, was
premised on a division between the senses, the intellect and the
emotions, foreshadowing the idea of psychology as being composed of
three functions that can be studied separately. Kasper Hauser is included
in Candland's reflections as a feral child but he was not strictly one. He
was raised by humans in confinement and with minimal sustenance. The
discussion here is inconclusive as it seems no one attempted a study of
Kasper Hauser's abilities, the 'experts' being more concerned with the
illegality of confinement.
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Amala and Kamala, both reared by wolves were investigated to
determine how or whether culture could be taught. The mother wolf was
cruelly killed in front of them. Reverend Singh, the chief investigator
wrote that up to three months after capture they showed a dislike for
everything human and Amala died shortly after capture. It is curious that
Candland makes nothing of these events. In fact the book engages only
very fleetingly with moral issues in the conclusion.
Candland introduces a discussion of four directions in contemporary
psychology: the notion of measuring mental ability, psychoanalysis,
behaviourism and phenomenology. Psychoanalysis is presented through
Freud's account of Little Hans and many key concepts are clearly
portrayed. Candland insists on the utility rather than the veracity of
psychoanalysis, incorrectly I think, attributing such a perspective to
Freud.
Supposedly leading into his discussion of behaviourism, Candland
outlines the accounts of the abilities of the horses, Clever Hans, Zarif
and Muhamed, suggesting that experts' descriptions had a great deal to
do with their expectations. Interestingly Candland argues for the
cleverness of Hans on grounds other than those provided by
contemporary experts. Behaviourism is in fact barely mentioned.
Phenomenology is introduced with a discussion of the reading abilities
of certain dogs and the investigators' attempts to communicate via words
with the dogs. Candland argues that the questions of those who studied
these horses and dogs move away from those asked of the feral children
towards an emphasis on communication. The idea of a mental ladder
which arranges animal species by their intelligence is then introduced
looking at the studies of chimpanzees early this century in the United
States and Garner's attempts to study chimpanzee communication by
living in Africa and interacting with them in their natural state. This is
fascinating material though received sceptically at the time by Western
scientists as Garner's observational reports were mixed up with reports
by Africans presumed incapable of credible testimony. Thorndike's work
on the learning abilities of a range of animals is outlined. The criticism
that such laboratory work is flawed because of the artificial nature of the
test situation is elaborated. It is interesting to note however that
Thorndike's studies of monkey's learning abilities prompted his claim in
1901 that 'the monkey justifies his inclusion with man in a separate
mental genus'. The experimental work of Haggerty and Hamilton with
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monkeys early in this century is also discussed. The final hundred pages
deals with recent attempts at communication between people and apes,
carefully unearthing the assumptions often made here. The Kellogs'
study of the chimpanzee Gua in their home and the Hayes' study of the
chimpanzee Viki also living in their home revealed a great deal about
chimpanzees' abilities but the studies failed in their attempts to teach
human speech. The Gardners' attempts to communicate with the
chimpanzee Washoe and the Patterson's with the gorilla Koko, both met
with much greater success using sign language. Terrace's study of the
chimpanzee Nim also revealed Nim's competence in using signs but
Terrace was unsure of Nim's ability to create a sentence and generated
some scepticism about ape/human communication studies in general.
The second generation of chimpanzees in communication studies which
Candland claims focused on meaning, are then outlined. The Premacks'
studies of Sarah and other chimpanzees provide credible examples of
meaningful communications especially related to lying and deception.
Duane Rumbaugh and others' attempts to communicate with another
chimpanzee also using an artificial language and the even more
surprising results with the chimpanzees Sherman and Austin with the
investigator Savage Rumbaugh also help overcome earlier scepticism
and generate more sophisticated questions. The research with the bonobo
Kanzi is only briefly mentioned which is disappointing given the extent
and originality of his purported communication with Sue Savage
Rumbaugh.
It is good to bring all this empirical material together but it is only
related to the psychologies in the vaguest of ways; for example, the
accounts of animals' communications often bring in perceptions and
phenomenology is concerned with the study of perceptions. Candland's
conclusion is surely correct however that there is much more to find out
about animal/ human communication and that the studies should take
more account of how human categories of thought affect outcomes.
Candland is an oblique sort of thinker making his writing unpredictable
and interesting but also a little frustrating if you prefer writers to follow
their aims in a straight forward manner. The book is unwieldy but it
opens up reflection in a multiplicity of directions. Even though it is
already a long book it would have been good to consider the story of
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Jeanie, a modern Kasper Hauser and the investigations into
human/dolphin communication along with the material Candland covers.
Denise Russell
Rollin, Bernard E., The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social
Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals, xiv + 241pp. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1995.
Bernard Rollin is well known for his philosophical writings concerning
humans' moral obligations to animals (see Animal Rights and Human
Morality, Second edition, (N.Y: Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1992) and
The Unheeded Cry, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). The
Unheeded Cry is a brilliant analysis of the culture of science and how it
works against the interests of animals. Rollin is not as opposed to the
genetic engineering of animals as these earlier books might lead one to
suspect. In The Frankenstein Syndrome he presents such engineering as a
neutral tool which may be used wisely or not. A suspicion falls over this
approach if we substitute 'humans' for 'animals' here. It seems that it is
not possible to view the genetic engineering of humans as a mere tool.
Yet Rollin comes close to this when he claims that there is nothing
inherently wrong with human genetic manipulation. Perhaps this just
highlights the need to speak about specific procedures. While Rollin's
discussion does get down to specifics in relation to animals he apparently
regards all procedures as mere tools even when these involve for
instance, the creation of animal models of human disease.
Rollin is concerned that our ideas about genetic engineering of animals
not be dominated by the 'Frankenstein Myth'; that the creation of new
life by scientific intervention must have 'hellish' consequences. He
believes that the genetic engineering of animals has 'patent and
incalculable social and economic benefits'. He seems to suggest that
animals may benefit too but he does not clarify this beyond some brief
speculations about possibly in the future breeding animals to better suit
current farming practices, e.g.. more content battery chickens, or
introducing genes for disease resistance.
Rollin also states that genetic engineering of animals cannot now be
stopped arguing that it is too simple and relatively inexpensive to
accomplish, and if it were to be banned in the U.S., it would be carried
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out in less restrictive environments elsewhere. He believes that control of
the technology is vital because it has the capacity to 'lead to a
proliferation of animal suffering many orders of magnitude greater than
what we have seen before'.
Rollin asks why the moral issues connected with genetic engineering
have not been brought forward by the scientific community itself. He
suggests that it is very difficult for those immersed in a field to gain the
necessary distance for such reflection, that the scientific ideology
outlined in The Unheeded Cry still dominates, unreceptive to moral
questions. Rollin argues that science necessarily involves values, e.g.
epistemic ones but also 'as a social phenomenon and human practice,
science cannot be isolated from social morality'.
Rollin criticizes claims that genetic engineering is intrinsically wrong.
While in general Rollin's arguments work well, there are two problematic
areas. Firstly, in arguing against Rifkin's purported link between
reductionism and genetic engineering, Rollin says that reductionism is
metaphysically, epistemologically and even morally wrong. However he
asserts that genetic engineering need not be connected to reductionism, a
point with which I agree, yet it seems to be denied by Rollin in his
Appendix describing genetic engineering. Here he says: 'The blueprint
for both species' commonality and individuality is carried by the genes,
which instruct and regulate the animals in how to develop, grow and
form throughout life'.
Secondly, in his discussion of environmental philosophy and genetic
engineering, Rollin makes several fallacious moves, most notably not
taking account of the variety of approaches which constitute
'environmental philosophy'. His critique of Holmes Rolston's account of
intrinsic value of natural objects is well worked out, but Val Plumwood's
position in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature is not so vulnerable to
attack. Rollin's approach here reflects the long standing and unnecessary
conflict between philosophers concerned about animals and those
concerned about the environment.
A lengthy section in the book examines the potential dangers arising
from genetic engineering of animals for humans and ecosystems. This is
wide-ranging and well done except that the tone in places is rather too
jocular for the subject matter. There is a strong argument for public
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involvement in decisions about acceptance, rejection or monitoring of
genetic engineering of animals and some practical suggestions for
regulatory structures. He points out the lack of current regulation in the
commercial domain.
About one third of the book is given over to ethical considerations in
relation to animals that arise from genetic engineering and some very
sensible discussion of how to provoke changes in attitudes. Rollin claims
that he is moving beyond talk of kindness vs cruelty to develop an ethics
of rights applicable to animals. However he does not answer or even
discuss the hard questions about a rights-based philosophy. Some law
reforms are suggested which if implemented, would provide some good
safeguards. These reforms are not contingent upon the acceptance of a
rights philosophy.
As one of the first major works devoted to ethical questions concerning
the use of animals in genetic engineering this book is to be praised. It is
very informative and provides a good start to thinking about
philosophical issues. As an attempt to explode the Frankenstein Myth
however the book is a failure
Denise Russell
BOOK NOTES
Masson, Jeffrey and McCarthy, Susan,When Elephants Weep: The
Emotional Lives of Animals , 268pp. (Jonathan Cape, London,1994).
Masson, famous for his trenchant critiques of psychiatry, together with
McCarthy, presents a fascinating series of accounts of emotions in
animals. The main part of the book is organised around descriptions of
fear, hope, rage, cruelty, friendship, grief, sadness, happiness,
compassion, altruism, shame and justice. It is valuable to have this
material collected together, some of it is well known, much of it is not.
Detailed notes and references are included. When Animals Weep lacks
philosophical sophistication: the core concept of emotion is inadequately
conceptualized and there is only superficial argument concerning the
attribution of emotions or feelings to animals. Yet it is difficult to put
down.
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Adams Carol J. and Donovan, Josephine, editors, Animals and Women:
Feminist Theoretical Explorations, ix + 381pp., (Duke University Press,
Durham, 1995.
Animals and Women is a collection of 13 essays by 13 authors on the
interlocking oppressions of sexism and speciesism. A few of the essays
have a literary focus but otherwise the specific topics are very diverse
applying the general theme to science, crime, hunting, pornography,
abortion, farm animals, and politics. Lynda Birke's essay ,' Exploring the
Boundaries: Feminism, Animals and Science', develops an important
critical perspective towards the reluctance of much of the feminist
literature to challenge conventional ideas about animals. The book
contains a very useful nine page bibiography of feminist approaches to
animal issues.
Noble, William and Davidson, Iain, Human Evolution, Language and
Mind: A Psychological and Archaeological Inquiry, xiii + 272pp.,
Cambridge University Press,1966.
Noble is a psychologist and Davidson an archaeologist and they attempt
to unite the two disciplines to outline the process of evolutionary
emergence of the phenomena of mind, language, and 'higher
consciousness'. The focus is on humans and other apes and on what
might count as evidence for language acquisition. This is a careful study
with some interesting conclusions. The Savage-Rumbaugh research
findings with Kanzi are discussed but thought not to be generalizable to
wild primates or the common ancestor as Kanzi's environment (involving
human communication) is different. Noble and Davidson argue that it is
the human nature of the interactive context in the case of Kanzi that
engenders the powers and capacities of mind expressed in that creature.
The question then shifts from 'can bonobos use language?' to 'is Kanzi
human?' A positive answer to this question would preserve the authors'
belief that language is the key to human mentality. It would be
interesting to juxtapose the direction of this argument with the dolphin
studies reported for instance in L. Herman, 'Receptive Competencies in
Language-Trained Animals' in Rosenblatt, J et al eds., Advances in the
Study of Behavior. It is not quite so plausible to think about of dolphins
as human.

